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Within the spokes model of Chen and Riordan (2007) that allows
for non-localized competition among arbitrary numbers of media out-
lets, we quantify the e®ect of concentration of ownership on quality
and bias of media content. A main result shows that too few commer-
cial outlets, or better, too few separate owners of commercial outlets
can lead to substantial bias in equilibrium. Increasing the number
of outlets (commercial and non-commercial) tends to bring down this
bias; but the strongest e®ect occurs when the number of owners is in-
creased. Allowing for free entry provides lower bounds on ¯xed costs
above which substantial commercial bias occurs in equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
Motivated by the recent media policy debate in the United States and ongo-
ing attempts by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to loosen
ownership rules there (see e.g., McChesney, 2004, for a description of the
events around the 2003 attempt; another such episode occurred in 2007), we
develop a model of media competition that allows for a somewhat detailed
study of the quality and bias of media content for a number of di®erent
ownership structures. The analysis builds on the spokes model of Chen and
Riordan (2007), which is a Hotelling type model of spatial competition that
allows for arbitrary numbers of media ¯rms and outlets (commercial and
non-commercial) that compete against each other in a non-localized fashion.
We show that excessively concentrated media markets, beyond a certain
cut-o®, can result in substantial bias of media content. Increasing the number
of separately owned media ¯rms in the market helps towards reducing the
bias; increasing the number of commercial outlets, while keeping the number
of owners ¯xed, can also help, but clearly to a lesser extent.1
The channel through which the bias occurs in our model is through the
funding of commercial media outlets by advertisers and the internalization
of the e®ect of the media outlets' content on the advertisers' sales and ad-
vertising budgets. A motivating example for our analysis is the coverage of
tobacco related health hazards in the US. For decades, despite hundreds of
thousands of deaths a year, serious statistics and medical information about
the health hazards of smoking were kept away from mainstream commercial
media (see e.g., Baker, 1994, and Bagdikian, 2004, for chronologies as well as
references documenting the statistical impact of advertising on the coverage
1In a companion paper (see Germano and Meier, 2008) we study a variant where
increasing the number of commercial outlets, while keeping the number of owners ¯xed,
actually deepens the bias albeit slightly.
1of tobacco related health hazards; see also Ellman and Germano, 2009, for
further discussion and references). Bagdikian (2004, pp. 250-252) summarizes
\there were still more stories in the daily press about the causes of in°uenza,
polio, and tuberculosis than about the cause of one in every seven deaths
in the United States," so that, in the 1980's, some \64 million Americans,
obviously already addicted, smoked an average of 26 cigarettes a day" with
surveys indicating that half the general and two-thirds the smoking popula-
tion did not think smoking made a great di®erence in life expectancy, Baker
(1994, p. 51).2 Our model claims that alongside advertising, concentration
in the media markets plays an important role in explaining such bias.
Model. The basic model is structured as follows. There are n (¸ 2)
commercial media outlets and a mass one of consumers. Media outlets are
located at the endpoints (one for each outlet) of a spokes network that has
N ¸ n potential locations. Commercial media are assumed to maximize
pro¯ts which are derived from advertising and payments from the audience
minus the costs of producing the programming. Later in Section 3.4, we
consider the important case where commercial media ¯rms can own multiple
(· ¸ 1) outlets, in which case the ·n total outlets are located at ·n di®er-
ent endpoints of a spokes network with N ¸ ·n endpoints; and ¯nally in
Section 4 we also allow for the possibility of m (¸ 0) non-commercial media
outlets (funded by viewer fees or by an exogenously given budget) to be in
the market, again each one located at a di®erent endpoint of a network with
N ¸ ·n + m endpoints.
Consumers are uniformly distributed along the N spokes of the network.
Transportation (or switching) costs re°ect di®erent costs consumers may have
of switching from a most preferred to a second most preferred outlet. As in
Chen and Riordan (2007), consumers have a preference for only two of the
N potential outlets. This guarantees continuity and simplicity of demands.
One interpretation is that beyond the second most preferred outlet consumers
prefer a non-media outside option. If N > ·n (or N > ·n + m) then there
2In 2007, according to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention of the US Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, cigarette smoking remained the leading preventable
cause of death in the US, accounting for approximately 1 of every 5 deaths (= 438,000
people) per year.
2are some consumers who are interested in consuming exactly two, one or zero
of the ·n (or ·n + m) actual outlets.
Assumptions. Besides the assumptions implicit in the framework, the
analysis relies on three key assumptions: (A1) Advertisers advertise with all
commercial media outlets proportionally to their audience share (si ¸ 0);
(A2) advertisers spend a constant fraction (´ > 0) of their ¯nal sales on
ads; (A3) advertisers' ¯nal sales can be written as C(x) = '(x)C0, where
' is a decreasing function of the sensitive information variable x and C0 is
an exogenously given level of base consumption of the advertised products.
Assumptions (A1)-(A3) combined imply that any media outlet i's advertising
revenues can be written as si ´ C(x).
(A1) assumes advertisers value consumers equally, and essentially ab-
stracts from issues of targeting, whereby advertisers strategically target au-
diences of particular interest to them (see e.g., George and Waldfogel, 2003,
Hamilton, 2004, and StrÄ omberg, 2004, for models of targeting and their ef-
fects). (A2) is an approximation; Schmalensee (1972) derives that spending a
constant fraction of ¯nal sales on advertising can actually be an optimal rule
in many circumstances and also provides some empirical support for such
behavior; Baghestani (1991), Jung and Seldon (1995), Elliott (2001) provide
further empirical evidence; but see also Esteve and Requena (2006) for some
quali¯cations.
(A3) is probably the more critical of the three assumptions. One can
view the information variable x as being essentially de¯ned through this
assumption and therefore interpret it as representing any \generic" variable
measuring programming content that has a decreasing net e®ect on aggregate
demand (or on aggregate advertising revenues).3 Generally speaking this
is content that a®ects consumption of advertised products; for example it
can be information sensitive to advertisers whose products fail to meet basic
3Peter Duersch has suggested a micromodel of this whereby advertisers whose products
do not comply with certain basic standards spend more on advertising, making them
relatively more attractive to media outlets (if not the media might not mind too much
reporting information sensitive to them); if this is the case then it is easy to see that
reporting sensitive information on such products would lead to a net decrease of aggregate
advertising revenues, which is what is really needed for our results.
3standards. Clearly what x represents more concretely can vary over time, and
an implication of our analysis is that with excessively concentrated media, the
time lags of shifting production to higher standard products can be prolonged
due to de¯cient coverage of the issue. Further interpretations of the variable
x follow below.4 The main object of the present paper can also be seen
as studying the implications of assumption (A3) on programming content
within a location model of product di®erentiation.
Results. Given these assumptions, we derive a cut-o® number ¹ n such
that if there are fewer outlets in the market, then in equilibrium sensitive
information can be completely suppressed (x = 0); on the other hand, a
su±ciently large number of outlets will always guarantee no suppression or
maximum accuracy (x = 1) (Proposition 1). The result is robust to fur-
ther ownership structures, like allowing media ¯rms to own multiple outlets
(Proposition 5) or to adding non-commercial ones (Proposition 8). While
audience-funded commercial media tend to be more informative, the pos-
sibility of drawing revenues from advertisers can undo this potential e®ect
(Propositions 3 and 4).
Moreover, if there is free entry and ¯xed costs are high, the market may
not support su±ciently many separate ¯rms in equilibrium to ensure full
accuracy. Introducing non-commercial outlets can bring down the critical
number ¹ n of commercial ¯rms or outlets needed to avoid substantial bias
(Proposition 8), but clearly their ability to attract su±cient audiences relies
on non-negligible budgets.
Finally, the framework also allows media outlets to choose a further qual-
ity variable (y) that is separate from the mentioned accuracy variable x. We
show that essentially only the audience funded media achieve the e±cient
amount of this quality variable (Proposition 3). The propositions and struc-
tural claims about media content and quality obtained can in principle be
tested empirically.
4For a concrete example of how media content can a®ect viewers' behavior at a deep
level, see La Ferrara et al. (2008), who suggest that the fertility rates of Brazilian women
were signi¯cantly a®ected by the introduction of the Rede Globo TV channel in their
region. Baker and George (2008) suggest that TV access in the US may have a®ected
household indebtedness in the 1950's.
4Evidence and notion of bias. The information variable x is at the
center of our model. At a ¯rst level it measures the amount of informa-
tion provided on \sensitive" topics (de¯ned implicitly by assumption (A3)
through the e®ect on C(x)), so that x = 0 corresponds to what we call min-
imum accuracy or substantial bias (also full suppression or self-censorship),
while at the other end, x = 1 corresponds to maximum accuracy or absence
of suppression (no censorship). But more concretely, the variable x can rep-
resent a variety of things. For example, it could represent information that a
product or a family of products does direct harm to a consumer (as in the case
of tobacco; or also dangerous or \unhealthy" toys, cars, fattening foods or
drinks; pharmaceutical products with potentially serious side e®ects,5 etc.); it
could be information that products are made in a possibly non-desirable way
(e.g., with genetically modi¯ed organisms, or with toxic materials) or under
non-desirable conditions (e.g., that are in violation of basic standards such
as the Ethical Trading Initiative, environmental standards, etc.). In each
case, repeated exposure to sensitive information may put o® some consumers
from buying certain products and hence may decrease the total amount of
the \generic" advertised good demanded. According to our model, a main
reason for suppressing coverage on, say, tobacco and climate change is the
presence of large advertisers6
Two well-documented examples are the coverage of health hazards of
smoking, mentioned above, and of anthropogenic climate change.7 Both
are examples where inadequate reporting has highly nontrivial consequences,
individual or global.
5There is a sizeable literature appearing in medical journals on how to limit advertisers,
particularly pharmaceutical sponsors, from interfering with the medical content of the
scienti¯c articles (see e.g. Lexchin and Light, 2006).
6Tobacco companies such as Brown & Williamson (part of British American Tobacco)
or Philip Morris (previously part of Altria Group) as well as for instance car manufacturers
such as General Motors or Ford have consistently been top advertisers in the US at di®erent
points in time (e.g., Baker, 1994, and Advertising Age, 2007).
7E.g., while Oreskes (2004) ¯nds that none of the 928 scienti¯c papers published be-
tween 1993-2003 disagree with the \scienti¯c consensus position" that \most of the ob-
served global warming over the last 50 years is due to the greenhouse gas concentration,"
Boyko® and Boyko® (2004) ¯nd that over half of a random sample of articles published
between 1988-2002 in the New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, Wall
Street Journal, give equal attention to the scienti¯c consensus position and to the industry-
supported view that \natural °uctuations su±ce to explain global warming."
5A further interpretation of the variable x { probably more pertinent to TV
outlets { is the amount of \critical" programming in the sense of the inverse
of \dumbed down" content. The latter appears to improve the e®ective-
ness of advertising on the reception and eventual consumption of advertised
products. Barnouw (1978), Baker (1994, 2007), Bagdikian (2004), McChes-
ney (2004), and Hamilton (2004) among others present evidence suggesting
an increase in \dumbed down" content in the US over the last decades; which
in view of the increased concentration of the media is not inconsistent with
our model. Clearly, a rigorous and empirical analysis of the relationship still
needs to be carried out.8
Related literature. Particularly relevant is Ellman and Germano (2009),
who study the e®ect of advertiser in°uence on media content by explicitly
modeling advertisers and consumers, besides the usual media outlets. In-
stead, the present paper simpli¯es the analysis, focuses on media outlets as
the main players and introduces transportation costs in order to quantify
the e®ect of di®erent ownership structures on media content variables. In
particular, it should be emphasized that the present paper underestimates
the e®ect of (large) advertisers on media content as it does not model direct
threats by advertisers to withdraw their ads from individual media outlets.
This is an important additional channel in Ellman and Germano (2009) that
can be e®ective even when competition between outlets is strong. We refer
to that paper for further discussion also of related literature.
Also closely related is Armstrong and Weeds (2007) who use a Hotelling
model (for the case n = 2) and a Salop model (when n ¸ 2) to evaluate
the role of public broadcasting and pay TV on the quality of programming
(see also e.g., Anderson and Coate, 2005, and Peitz and Valletti, 2008).
Their focus with advertising concerns the quality of programming and the
disutility from having to watch ads. To their analysis our paper adds that
8Another related aspect concerns the amount of educational, social, or \public interest"
content of commercial media. For example, Putnam (2000) attributes a substantial part
of the civil disengagement he documents in the United States to TV and other electronic
media, and goes on to state that \[n]o sector of American Society will have more in°uence
on the future state of our social capital than the electronic mass media[..]" (p. 410).
Testing the commercial media's performance in this respect seems worthwhile. Prat and
StrÄ omberg (2005) and Gentzkow and Shapiro (2008b) have some partial results on this.
6advertising may not only a®ect viewers through the disutility of watching ads
but also through the interference of advertisers with content. As is clear from
our examples, this may lead to substantial externalities and welfare e®ects
that should be taken into account when computing the \e±cient" amount of
advertising.
Besley and Prat (2006) and Petrova (2008) model political in°uence in the
media through models of bribes or lobbying and obtain that competition in
the media sector can be e®ective in reducing the in°uence on media content.
By contrast, in the targeting models of George and Waldfogel (2003) or
StrÄ omberg (2004), but also in the model of Mullanaithan and Shleifer (2005),
competition in the media need not always help to reduce biased content as
the bias here is ultimately driven by consumer preferences. For the purpose
of this paper we ignore these types of biases and focus instead on aspects of
advertiser driven (or commercial) media bias.
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) study political slant in newspapers and,
while they ¯nd slant at the individual newspaper level, they do not ¯nd
signi¯cant evidence that newspaper ownership really matters in explaining
the individual papers' biases. Our analysis suggests that it might be worth
carrying out a similar type of test with respect to commercial bias of given
media ¯rms' di®erent outlets. Reuter and Zitzewitz (2006) provides empirical
evidence of bias favoring advertisers in certain ¯nancial publications.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the basic model used
throughout the paper. Sections 3 studies environments with only commercial
outlets in some detail and Section 4 introduces non-commercial outlets and
also studies mixed environments with both commercial and non-commercial
outlets. Section 5 studies free entry and Section 6 concludes. Most proofs
and derivations are contained in an appendix.
2 The basic framework
We work with the spokes model of Chen and Riordan (2007) that allows
for an arbitrary number of media outlets to compete for audience in a non-
localized fashion. The model we develop shares important features with a
7number of other papers in the media literature that have worked with the
Hotelling model (when n = 2) or the Salop model (when n ¸ 2), see for
example, Anderson and Coate (2005), Armstrong and Weeds (2007), Peitz
and Valletti (2008), and Weeds (2008).
There are n (¸ 2) commercial media outlets located at the endpoints (one
for each outlet) of a spokes network that has N ¸ n potential locations. Any
two endpoints have distance 1 from each other (and each endpoint therefore
has distance 1
2 to the center of the network). Commercial media outlets
are assumed to maximize pro¯ts which are derived from advertising and
payments from the audience minus the costs of producing the programming.
There is a mass one of consumers uniformly distributed along the N
spokes of the network. Transportation (or switching) costs are the same for
all consumers in the sense that there is a constant cost t > 0 to \travel" a unit
distance (or to \switch" to another outlet).9 As in Chen and Riordan (2007),
consumers have a preference for only two of the N potential outlets, namely,
the outlet corresponding to the spoke the consumer is located on and another
one chosen at random with uniform probability from all the remaining N ¡1
potential outlets. This guarantees continuity and signi¯cantly simpli¯es the
analysis. When N > n this means that there are some consumers who are
interested in consuming exactly two, one or zero of the n actual outlets.10
There are N potential outlets and n actual ones. Each consumer has a
preference for (at most) two potential outlets so that if N > n some con-
sumers may have a preference for one or zero actual outlets.Consumers are
therefore indi®erent or close to indi®erent between the two brands, both of
which are available on the market. Any two ¯rms compete for such consumers
that are approximately indi®erent between their products, while at the same
time competing with other ¯rms for other consumers. Notice that this si-
multaneous competition on several fronts is what distinguishes this spokes
9Transportation costs are between 0 and t depending on the location of the consumer.
A consumer located at the endpoint of a spoke incurs a transportation cost of 0 for
consuming the outlet located at the same endpoint and incurs a cost of t for consuming
his second most preferred outlet instead. By contrast a consumer located at the center of
the network is indi®erent between his two most preferred outlets and incurs the same cost
t
2 for consuming either one.
10In Germano and Meier (2008), we study the particular case where N = n, so the
market is \covered" and each consumer has a preference for exactly two actual outlets.
8model with Salop's (1979) model, where a given ¯rm competes essentially
with its two neighbors.
There is an exogenous degree of horizontal product di®erentiation be-
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t if jui ¡ uj j · t
1 if ui ¡ uj > t
;
where t > 0 is a transportation cost, and where outlet i's utility is given by
ui = v + ®xi + ¯yi ¡ pi :
and where v À ® + ¯ is the exogenous valuation of consuming the media;
®;¯ ¸ 0 are parameters; xi;yi 2 [0;1], where xi is the level of information
reported on sensitive topics; yi is an endogenous measure of quality, separated
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where, given our assumption on the exogenous values v >> 0, we can de¯ne











n(2N ¡ n ¡ 1)
N(N ¡ 1)
; (1)
Aggregate demand for the advertisers' products is given by




9where x = (x1;:::;xn) is the vector of information on sensitive topics re-
ported, (recall that xi represents outlet i's level), and Ã 2 [0;1] is a constant
representing the marginal e®ect on ¯nal consumption of the information avail-
able to the audience.
Implicitly Eq. (2) assumes that there is a generic information variable
that depresses consumption of advertised products at a decreasing rate. The
functional form is chosen mainly for analytic tractability. (In Germano and
Meier, 2008, we work with a linear version, and obtain qualitatively compara-
ble results with respect to our main results). As discussed in the introduction,
we interpret x as representing a variety of di®erent things; but strictly speak-
ing we take Eq. (2) as the de¯ning characteristic of the variable x; a reader
that believes that such a generic variable cannot seriously a®ect aggregate
branded consumption will tend to believe in a low value of Ã. We also some-
times speak of \substantial bias" or \self-censorship" when the value of xi is
set to zero. As mentioned in the introduction, the topics or issues that are
subject to such bias or censorship can easily shift over time.
3 Commercial media
We assume commercial media maximize pro¯ts, which consist of revenues
from advertising and from fees paid by the audience minus the costs of pro-
ducing the programming. Speci¯cally, a given commercial media outlet i
maximizes pro¯ts given by,






where, since we assume a mass one of consumers, C is at the same time total
and per capita consumption of the advertised products; pi is the revenue from
all consumers as well as the price paid by an individual consumer to access
outlet i; yi is the level of quality of the programming that is accessed equally
by all consumers who have access to the outlet; 0 < ´ < 1, ± >
´C0
n are
¯xed parameters, where the assumption on ± ensures that yi 2 [0;1]. The
¯rst and second expressions represent revenues from advertising and from
the audience respectively. As discussed in the introduction, we assume that
10advertising revenues are a ¯xed share of total sales of the advertised products
weighted by the audience share of the outlet. The third expression represents
the costs of producing quality of programming. This can be viewed as a ¯xed
cost to produce a programming of quality yi; for simplicity we also assume
that providing information xi is costless.
From the cost and utility functions described above, we can compute the
socially e±cient levels of x¤
i and y¤
i that a media outlet should supply, namely,
x¤
i = 1 and y¤
i =
¯
±si, which, in the symmetric benchmarks we consider below,
become
x









2N ¡ n ¡ 1
N(N ¡ 1)
: (3)
As we will see in the following sections, too few media outlets can lead to sub-
stantial deviations from the socially e±cient level of the information variable
(x¤), whereas the quality variable (y¤) is relatively less a®ected by this.
3.1 Advertising funded media
We ¯rst consider purely advertising funded media where by assumption prices

























n2 , so that, when the ¯rst inequality holds, it is best
to set the maximum level of accuracy (x = 1), while it is best to set the








with respect to n and using Eq. (1) de¯ning An, gives the critical number of
media outlets





®N(N ¡ 1)2(®N + 8Ãt)
2Ãt
; (4)








Figure 1: Plots of the cut-o® number of outlets ¹ n needed to guarantee full accuracy
(x = 1) as a function of preference parameter ® for transportation costs t = 1
(black), t = 5 (dark grey) and t = 10 (light grey) and [N = 100;Ã = :1]; the areas
above the ¹ n{curves are at the same time the combinations of (®;n) that avoid
censorship (x = 0), (for t = 1;5;10).
at which the optimal strategy switches from minimum to maximum accu-
racy.11 It can further be shown that for n < ¹ n we have that x = 0 is the
unique symmetric equilibrium; while for n > ¹ n we have x = 1. This leads to
the ¯rst main result.
Proposition 1 In a market with N potential media outlets and n < N actual
purely advertising funded outlets there is a unique symmetric equilibrium with
minimum accuracy (x = 0) whenever n · ¹ n, and with maximum accuracy
(x = 1) whenever n > ¹ n, where ¹ n is given in Eq. (4) above.
This shows that media markets that are too heavily concentrated or that
have too few outlets (n · ¹ n) have substantial bias (x = 0). A larger num-
ber of outlets provides an incentive to report more accurately for two main
reasons: a competition e®ect and an externality e®ect. The competition ef-
fect derives from the marginal e®ect of increasing accuracy on a ¯rm's own
11The discontinuity of the equilibrium accuracy (x) at ¹ n (see Figure 2) is due to the
exponential form of the function C(x). This eliminates the variable x from the FOC so that
the optimal values are determined by the bounds 0 and 1. Using other functional forms
typically gives a region where x is increasing, but most of the time it is also determined
by the bounds 0 and 1 (see e.g., Germano and Meier, 2008, for the linear case). Notice
that marginal bene¯ts from reporting a positive x at x = 0 are always bounded which is
why equilibrium accuracy is zero for low values of n.









Figure 2: Plots of accuracy (x, solid) and quality (y, dashed) as functions of the
number of outlets n for t = 1 (grey) and t = 5 (black) and [N = 100;¯ = 1;Ã = :1];
higher transportation costs (t) reduce accuracy and quality.
share, (
@si
@xi), which increases with the number of outlets; the externality e®ect
derives from the marginal e®ect of increasing accuracy on total advertising
revenues, (´ @C
@xi), which decreases as the number of outlets increases. Lower
transportation costs (t) and a low marginal e®ect of sensitive information on
consumption (Ã) tend to relax the constraint on the number of outlets needed
to avoid substantial bias (see Figure 1), while a lower preference parameter
on sensitive issues (®), which might in turn be induced by low \awareness"
of these issues, tightens the constraint.

















We can state the following.
Proposition 2 Under the conditions of Proposition 1, the optimal quality








¡ÃAn if n > ¹ n;
where An is de¯ned in Eq. (1).
13In particular, in both cases, the level of quality (y) is increasing in the number
of actual media outlets (n) and in the preference parameter for quality (¯),
and is decreasing in the transportation costs (t). Comparing these quality
levels with the socially e±cient one given in Eq. (3) it is easy to see that also
here too few media outlets may lead to an ine±ciently low level of quality.
Clearly, the advertising revenues (´C) play a key positive role here, so that
unlike with the accuracy variable (x), the number of outlets are relatively
less important here. This will play a role when comparing commercial and
non-commercial media.
3.2 Audience funded media
Next consider media outlets funded exclusively by the audience who pay a
fee pi for accessing media outlet i and assume (for now) ´ = 0. From the

















with An de¯ned in Eq. (1), which gives
p =





(2N ¡ n ¡ 1)
N(N ¡ 1)
as the equilibrium price and quality.
Proposition 3 In a market with N potential media outlets and 2 · n < N
actual purely audience funded media outlets, there is a unique symmetric
equilibrium where maximum accuracy (x = 1) and the socially e±cient level
of quality (y = y¤) are supplied at positive prices.
Essentially, the costs incurred by the outlets for providing quality do not
depend on the audience size whereas revenues do; both accuracy and quality
provided will coincide with the socially e±cient levels obtained in Eq. (3)
above. Armstrong and Weeds (2007) get a similar result for the standard
Hotelling model.
143.3 Audience and advertising funded media
Before considering multiple ownership, we brie°y consider the general case
where outlets can obtain revenues from both advertising and directly from the
audience. Solving for equilibria where all media outlets choose simultaneously
accuracy on the sensitive topic xi, quality yi, and prices charged pi, we obtain
from the FOC's, after imposing symmetry,
p =
·










From here we see that whenever transportation costs are not too large, t ·
n¡1
2N¡n¡1´C0e¡ÃAn, prices are automatically set to zero, in which case the
equilibria reduce to the ones studied in Section 3.1.
Proposition 4 If transportation costs are not excessively large, namely, t ·
n¡1
2N¡n¡1´C0e¡ÃAn, then the media outlets will choose not to charge their au-
dience (p = 0) and so will be exclusively advertising funded. The equilibrium
levels of bias and quality will coincide with the ones of Propositions 1 and 2.
We interpret this as saying that unless there are very large transportation
costs (as can occur e.g., with a live event such as a soccer or football match)
or very small contributions from advertising (e.g., when ´ or C0 are very
small) media outlets refrain from charging their audiences (in fact, when
t < n¡1
2N¡n¡1´C0e¡ÃAn outlets might even be willing to pay the audiences for
consuming their outlet). We take the zero price case as the more relevant
one for the purposes of this paper and do not pursue the case of positive
(nor negative) audience fees. At the same time, we implicitly take the view
that audience funded outlets, while socially e±cient will be cast aside (by
commercial outlets) whenever sizable advertising revenues are available.
3.4 Multiple ownership
In practice many media conglomerates own more than one media outlet in
the same market.12 We therefore turn to the important case where media
12For example, in 2008 Clear Channel owned over 1200 radio stations in the US; in many
areas multiple Clear Channel stations were in competition with each other (see Columbia
Journalism Review, 2008).
15¯rms can own multiple subsidiary outlets. Let n now denote the total number
of owners, and suppose for simplicity that each owner owns the same number


































i: De¯ning total audi-
ence reached as
A·n =
(2N ¡ ·n ¡ 1)·n
N(N ¡ 1)
;


















Again, these are either positive or negative depending on whether the number










(®N(N ¡ 1))2 + 4®Ã·tN(N ¡ 1)(2N ¡ · ¡ 1)
2Ã·2t
(5)
While the function ¹ n(·) is a decreasing function of ·, it is strictly increasing
when multiplied by ·, indicating that what matters in terms of avoiding
substantial bias is not just the number of total media outlets but also the
number of separately owned media ¯rms.13 Figure 3 plots ¹ n(·) together
with the maximum number of owners possible N
k . The intersection point
gives simultaneously the minimum number of separate owners ¹ nmin (= N
¹ ·max)
necessary to avoid the substantial bias as well as the maximum number of
13It is worth noting here that in the \covered" version of Chen and Riordan (2007),
where ·n = N and where increasing the number of outlets directly increases the total
number of spokes, the function ¹ n(·) actually increases with ·. This means that adding
additional outlets actually increases the chances of having substatial bias. See Germano
and Meier (2008) for the details.








Figure 3: Plot of ¹ n(·) (grey), N
· (black) and
¹ n(1)
· (dashed) as a function of the
number of subsidiary outlets owned · for [t = 5, N = 200;® = Ã = :1] as well
as ¹ n(1) ¼ 20 and ¹ nmin ¼ 6 (both dashed); the area above ¹ n(·) (grey) and below
N
· (black) are all the feasible combinations that avoid censorship (x = 0); they
intersect at (¹ ·max; ¹ nmin) ¼ (33;6).
media outlets ¹ ·max that can be owned, analytically,





and ¹ ·max =
®N2
®N + Ã(N ¡ 1)t
: (6)
Depending on the values of the parameters ®;Ã and t, the number ¹ ·max can
be substantially below N, which is the maximum number of outlets a media
¯rm can own while avoiding the censorship problem, if what mattered were
only the total number of outlets; similarly ¹ nmin is substantially above 1. Let
¹ n = ¹ n(1), then we can state our second main result.
Proposition 5 In a market with N potential media outlets, n ¸ 2 media
¯rms, each of which owns the same number · ¸ 1 of purely advertising funded
media outlets, and where ·n < N, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium
with minimum accuracy (x = 0) whenever n · ¹ n(·) and with maximum
accuracy (x = 1) whenever n > ¹ n(·), where ¹ n(·) is given in Eq. (5) and
satis¯es ¹ n(·) ¸
¹ n(1)
· with strict inequality whenever · > 1.
Moreover, a minimum of ¹ nmin > 1 separate media owners (with ¹ ·max
outlets each) are necessary to avoid minimum accuracy, where ¹ nmin (and
¹ ·max) are de¯ned in Eq. (6).
17This is the multiple ownership version of Proposition 1. It states that allowing
media ¯rms to own multiple media outlets can help but does not necessarily
avoid the problem of substantial bias. This is best seen in Figure 3, where
the grey curve (¹ n(·)) plots the number of owners necessary to avoid it.
The result also shows that the cut-o® ¹ n(·) is to an important extent about
the number of owners rather than the number of media outlets. To see the
extent, see again Figure 3, and compare the grey curve representing ¹ n(·) with
the dashed curve representing N
· which is the benchmark where what matters
is the total number of actual media outlets. The discrepancy becomes larger
for smaller values of ® or larger values of t. The intuition for the di®erence
is essentially due to the fact that, media ¯rms with multiple outlets have
additional monopoly power as they have more \captured" viewers,14 and the
e®ect of raising accuracy on their overall market share is also lower.






























which leads to the equilibrium prices and quality levels,
p =
·










Again, increasing the number of owners (n) or of subsidiary outlets per owner
(·) increases the quality (y) and decreases the price (p) chosen in equilibrium.
Proposition 6 In a market with n ¸ 2 media ¯rms, each of which owns
· ¸ 1 purely advertising funded media outlets, the level of quality is relatively
lower and prices are relatively higher than if there were ·n separate ¯rms.
As to be expected, due to the increasing monopoly power, if there are n ¯rms
with · > 1 outlets rather than ·n separate ¯rms, then the level of quality
14Notice that with n owners each of which owns · media outlets, the share of consumers
that are \trapped" between two ¯rms of a single owner is ·¡1




n as · goes from 1 up to N
n .
18(y) becomes relatively lower, and, in the cases where prices are positive, they
are relatively higher. In the remainder of the paper, to simplify, we treat the
case · = 1.
4 Adding a non-commercial sector
In order to capture the role of media outlets such as non-pro¯t radio stations,
TV stations, newspapers, and also increasingly important internet websites
and weblogs, some of which are in direct competition with other mainstream
outlets, we next consider a second type of media outlet, which we refer to
as non-commercial.15 Before studying the case of mixed markets with com-
mercial and non-commercial media outlets, we ¯rst brie°y consider the case
with only non-commercial outlets.
4.1 Non-commercial media
We assume non-commercial media maximize the utility provided to their
audience, ui, and operate under a given budget Bi ¸ 0. While we do not
intend to model public broadcasting in this paper (see e.g., Armstrong, 2005,
and Armstrong and Weeds, 2005, 2007, on this), we do not exclude that this
type of modeling may in fact capture the behavior of some public media
outlets.16








i · Bi + sipi;
where Bi ¸ 0 is the outlet's budget. The solution to this is given by













15See e.g., Curran (2000), Hallin and Mancini (2004), Baker (2007) and Kops (2007) for
discussions of di®erent types of media sectors and outlets and how they a®ect the overall
media system. What we model here is closest to what some of these authors call non-pro¯t
media (or even public media as opposed to state media).




j6=i(ui ¡ uj) where Am
is de¯ned just as in Eq. (1), they can be written as si = Á0 +Á1ui, for Á0;Á1 > 0 constant
as far as i's optimization problem is concerned, and taking the level of utility of the other
outlets as given, we see that maximizing ui is equivalent to maximizing its market share si.










¡ 1 = 0:
In particular, assuming a situation where media outlets are all symmetric
and non-commercial, we get













where here s = Am
m = 2N¡m¡1
N(N¡1) . We summarize this as follows.
Proposition 7 In a market with N potential media outlets and m < N
symmetric purely non-commercial media outlets (with no commercial outlets)
there is a unique symmetric equilibrium with maximum accuracy (x = 1) for
any m ¸ 1. The allocated budget and audience revenue (when these are
positive) are spent entirely on providing quality, y =
q
2(B+sp)
± , and prices







When prices are zero, the quality level is independent of the number (and
strategies) of the other non-commercial outlets and a budget of B = ±
2y¤2 is
required to achieve the socially e±cient quality level (y¤), whereas, if prices













Attempting to achieve the socially e±cient quality level in this case would
require a budget of B = ±2
2 y¤2 which is inconsistent with positive prices.
4.2 Mixed media markets
Most media markets have commercial and non-commercial media outlets
operating simultaneously. We next derive equilibria where the commercial
and non-commercial outlets just studied act symmetrically relative to their
type. We also characterize actual equilibrium shares of commercial vs. non-
commercial media. For simplicity, we do not allow media ¯rms to own more
than one outlet.
20There are N potential outlets of which n ¸ 2 are commercial and m ¸ 0
are non-commercial and where n+m < N such that there are N ¡n¡m >
0 potential ¯rms that are not present in the market. Commercial outlets
are indexed by i = 1;:::;n, as before, non-commercial ones are indexed
by i = n + 1;:::;n + m, and potential ones not present in the market by
i = n + m + 1;:::;N. We maintain the assumption jui ¡ uj j · t, for all
i;j = 1;:::;N ¡n¡m,17 so that, letting An+m denote the total share of the
commercial and non-commercial outlets' audience, we can write
An+m =
2N ¡ n ¡ m ¡ 1
N(N ¡ 1)
(n + m): (7)
Let ¾ =
Pn
i=1 si 2 [0;An+m] be the actual share of consumers that access
commercial media outlets from among all consumers, so that An+m ¡ ¾ is
the share that access non-commercial ones.
The assumption that viewers have a preference for only two outlets di-
rectly implies that 0 ·
(N¡m)(N¡m¡1)
N(N¡1) · ¾ · 1 ¡
(N¡n)((N¡n¡1)
N(N¡1) · 1.
From Section 4, assuming budgets are not too small or that there are
su±ciently many non-commercial outlets, we have pNC = 0. The optimal
strategy of the non-commercial media is





and we can write the pro¯t of the commercial media, for as





i; for i = 1;:::;n;





j=n+1 sj). Recall that,
for i = 1;:::;n,
si =







(ui ¡ uj) +






n(ui ¡ ¹ uC)
N(N ¡ 1)t
+
m(ui ¡ ¹ uNC)
N(N ¡ 1)t
:
17This assumption implies that all media outlets have similar budgets for their exogenous
positioning.
21Computing marginal pro¯ts, assuming type-symmetry, and taking into
account that ¾ depends on the shares of all ¯rms (and cannot therefore be
treated as a constant), gives from the FOC's, solving for xC,
xC = 1 +































where it can be checked that again both SOC's are satis¯ed.
Fixed and symmetric shares. To get a ¯rst idea of the e®ect of adding
non-commercial outlets to a given set of existing commercial outlets assume
for simplicity that the share ¾ is proportional to the number of commercial
outlets, ¾ =
nAn+m
n+m , for given m. Implicitly this assumes that each non-
commercial outlet has a su±ciently large budget to exogenously position itself
so as to potentially attract the same number of consumers as a commercial
outlet. Then it is easy to see that Eq. (8) above reduces to
xC = 1 +
(n + m ¡ 1)N(N ¡ 1)
Ãm(2N ¡ n ¡ m ¡ 1)
¡
(2N ¡ n ¡ m ¡ 1)t
®m
;
which is increasing in n. Solving for the cut-o® at which xC equals 1 gives





®N(N ¡ 1)2(®N + 8Ãt)
2Ãt
; (9)
which is equal to ¹ n¡m, where ¹ n is the cut-o® obtained in Eq. (4) with only
commercial outlets. This suggests that there is a one-to-one trade o® be-
tween commercial outlets and non-commercial outlets in terms of achieving
the cut-o® number of outlets ¹ nm that avoid substantial bias.18 Therefore,
18Solving for the cut-o® where xC = 0 gives a number smaller but close to ¹ nm. The
reason for the one-to-one trade o® is due to the fact that of the three channels through
which m a®ects the commercial ¯rms' reporting strategy, namely, through the competitive,
the externality e®ect and through the e®ect on the share ¾, given the assumption of a ¯xed
share ¾ and since the cut-o® is computed for xC = 1, only the competition e®ect remains
which has a one-to-one tradeo® between m and n. This is clear from the FOC's.







Figure 4: Plot of bounds ¤0 (black) and ¤1 (grey) as a function of n for m = 0
(solid lines) and for m = 10 (dashed lines) with [t = 5, N = 100;Ã = :1]; the areas
above the curves ¤1 (grey and dashed grey) are combinations with full accuracy
(x = 1), (for m = 0 and 10), whereas the areas below ¤0 (black and dashed black)
cannot avoid censorship (x = 0).
the real di®erence between commercial and non-commercial outlets in terms
of reaching the cut-o® ¹ nm (from a situation where n < ¹ nm) is that non-
commercial outlets always report xNC = 1 which over time may lead to a
higher ® (through higher awareness of sensitive issues amongst the popula-
tion) and also to a greater chance of achieving the relevant cut-o® (¹ nm) when
adding outlets. Since we do not endogenize the preference parameter ® here,
we leave a formal analysis for future research.
Endogenous shares. Next we turn to the more general case where the
share of the audience captured by commercial media is endogenous. From
Eq. (8) and assuming the bounds n
N · ¾ · 2n
N , the following expressions
¤0(Ã;t;m;n;N) =
Ãt(N ¡ 1)




(n + m ¡ 1)N
act respectively as upper and lower bounds for ® such that the following
three cases can be distinguished (see Figure 4),19
19Since ¾ is not (yet) determined and depends in an important way on n, we cannot
solve for n directly, but rather for ® which we bound using the functions ¤0 and ¤1.








Figure 5: Plot of ¹ nm as function of ® for m = 0 (light grey), m = 5 (dark grey)
and m = 20 (black) and [N = 100;¯ = 1;Ã = :1]; the areas above the curves ¹ nm
are combinations (®;n) with full accuracy (x = 1), (for m = 0;5, and 20).
CASE 1: xC = 0 occurring when ® · ¤0(Ã;t;m;n;N);
CASE 2: xC 2 [0;1] occurring when ¤0(Ã;t;m;n;N) < ® < ¤1(Ã;t;m;n;N);
CASE 3: xC = 1 occurring when ® ¸ ¤1(Ã;t;m;n;N).
Depending on the values of the parameters, any of the three cases can occur.
But it is clear, already from Eq. (8), that, given ® and the other parameters,
larger values of n;m tend to increase xC and also tend to make the conditions
for full accuracy (CASE 3 where xC = 1) more likely to be satis¯ed. Similarly,
when solving the model for the equilibrium ¾ and then for the corresponding
cut-o® ¹ nm one obtains that the more non-commercial media outlets there
are, the smaller ¹ nm is (see Figure 5); moreover, the trade o® between n and
m in reaching ¹ nm is close to the ¯xed share case where it is exactly equal to
one.
We can summarize as follows.
Proposition 8 In a market with N potential media outlets of which n are
commercial and m are non-commercial, and where N > n + m, everything
else equal, increasing C0 or ´ increases the equilibrium share of commercial
media (¾), while increasing B decreases it. Moreover, accuracy and quality
of the commercial media (respectively xC and yC) tend to increase with higher
values of ®, m, and n and tend to decrease with Ã, N, and t.
Overall, the analysis indicates that even with relatively low budgets, non-
24commercial media can have bene¯cial e®ects for both accuracy (xC) and
quality (yC) within the commercial media. We should stress that our spokes
model has an exogenous symmetry in terms of the positioning of the (actual
and potential) outlets, giving symmetric (exogenous) audience to commercial
and non-commercial outlets (implicitly this is an assumption about the out-
lets' budgets). While there are clearly very many non-commercial websites
that might qualify as a \media outlet", only a small portion have the ca-
pacity and visibility to count as an actual \media outlet" in our underlying
spokes model. Moreover, clearly, an increase in base consumption (C0) of
advertised products can partially crowd out non-commercial media, while an
increase in the budget allocated to non-commercial media (B) can partially
crowd out commercial media.
Finally, an aspect that is only partially captured by the present model
is the relative advantage of non-commercial media to bring down the cut-
o® ¹ nm through their e±cient reporting of the sensitive information variable
(xNC = 1). In an expanded model, this can be shown to raise awareness and
therefore also interest in accuracy by increasing the preference parameter ®
and thereby (signi¯cantly) reducing ¹ nm (see Figure 5). This aspect plays an
even more important role when modeling the internet and other low-budget
non-commercial media, but is left for future research, as we here take ® to
be ¯xed.
5 Free entry
To allow for free entry into the above markets, consider for simplicity the
setting of Section 3 with N potential ¯rms and n < N actual ¯rms which
are all commercial ¯rms and have one outlet each (· = 1) so that there are
no non-commercial ¯rms. Assume each outlet requires ¯xed costs K > 0 to
operate20 and solve for the lower bound level of ¯xed costs ¹ K that supports
fully informative equilibria. In other words solve for the level of ¯xed costs
20Fixed costs are crucial to understanding media market. Here we treat the issue in
a very simple way and leave a more detailed discussion, especially within the context of
multiple ownership and non-commercial media to future research. Weeds (2008) provides
a promising framework to analyze some of the open questions.
25¹ K such that actual ¯xed costs need to be below or equal to this lower bound,
then there will be full accuracy (x = 1).
Recall, that in the case of purely commercial outlets with n ¸ ¹ n, we have,
x = 1;y =
¯(n¡1)
N(N¡1)t´C0e¡ÃA;p = 0. Therefore, as the lower bound for the


















2N ¡ ¹ n ¡ 1 ¡










2Ãt . If actual ¯xed
costs are substantially above the lower bound ¹ K, then, using Proposition 1,
fully informative equilibria (with x = 1) will not be supported. Clearly, the
larger ¹ n the smaller ¹ K will have to be, and the less likely the case that a
fully informative market structure can be supported will be. In principle,
the formulas obtained for ¹ K give a further tool to empirically check the
possibilities for substantial bias in mainstream commercial outlets. They
can easily be extended to the cases studied above with multiple ownership
and noncommercial outlets.
6 Conclusion
The results have clear implications for the debate on the optimal owner-
ship structure in media markets. This has become particularly important in
the US recently where the FCC has tried twice (in 2003 and 2007) to relax
ownership rules to allow for media conglomerates to eventually own more
outlets. At the same time, the media market in the US is fairly and increas-
ingly concentrated already.21 Our results show that excessive concentration
21According to Bagdikian, 2004, ¯ve media conglomerates (Time Warner, Disney, News
Corporation, Viacom, and Bertelsman) produce more than half of all of US media con-
sumption; a number that was around ¯fty in the early 1980's, see Bagdikian (1983). Com-
paine and Gomery (2000) contains several quali¯cations of such ¯gures; an important
question concerns the notion of the \relevant" market; see also Baker (2007). The current
crisis appears to be accelerating the trend towards further concentration and consolidation
of media ownership.
26of ownership can lead to substantial bias in areas sensitive to advertisers,
and, moreover, the numbers we obtain as thresholds for the occurrence of
substantial bias in equilibrium are potentially alarming. On the other hand,
for example, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2008a) conclude their survey on the
role of competition in the market for news by saying that \we think it un-
likely that the existing level of concentration at the national level [in the
US] signi¯cantly limits the production of truth." Our analysis potentially
challenges such a viewpoint at some level. Clearly, more empirical work is
needed to validate the picture sketched by our model; several of the stylized
facts and insights derived can in principle be tested by the data. Essentially
this involves, identifying a relevant media market, quantifying the relevant
information variable and its marginal impact on advertising revenues, and
linking these variables also with a measure of concentration of ownership
in the media market. The case of the reporting on anthropogenic climate
change over the last few decades might be a good place to start.
Appendix
Proofs of Propositions 1{4. Before going into the individual proofs we









































































@pi = 0. Assuming symmetric equilibrium with xi = x;yi =





















































































































Proof of Proposition 1. By inspection of the marginal pro¯ts with respect
to xi, and assuming pi = 0, we have that pro¯ts are increasing whenever
®(n ¡ 1) >
Ãt(2N¡n¡1)2
N(N¡1) and decreasing whenever ®(n ¡ 1) <
Ãt(2N¡n¡1)2
N(N¡1) .
This means that when the ¯rst inequality holds, then it is best to set the
maximum level of accuracy (x = 1), while it is best to set the minimum level











Ã(2N ¡ n ¡ 1)2
N(N ¡ 1)
for n, gives us the number (of media outlets)





®N(N ¡ 1)2(®N + 8Ãt)
2Ãt




(®N)2 + ®N8Ãt ¡ ®N
´
;
at which the optimal strategy switches from minimum to maximum accuracy.
It can be shown that for n < ¹ n we have x = 0 as the unique symmetric
solution; while for n > ¹ n we have x = 1 as the unique symmetric solution.
28Proof of Proposition 3. Since ´ = 0, we immediately get x = 1 and for





















(2N ¡ n ¡ 1)t
n ¡ 1
; y =
¯(2N ¡ n ¡ 1)
±N(N ¡ 1)
:














as the unique symmetric equilibrium levels of price and quality. From here,
it is easy to see that if
(2N¡n¡1)t
n¡1 < ´C0e¡ÃAnx, which is the case pursued in
the paper, then the level of accuracy coincides with the one in Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 5. De¯ning total audience reached as
A·n =
(2N ¡ ·n ¡ 1)·n
N(N ¡ 1)
;
















































































































































































































































































Again, this expression is either positive or negative depending on whether n
















(®N(N ¡ 1))2 + 4Ã·t®N(N ¡ 1)(2N ¡ · ¡ 1) ¡ ®N(N ¡ 1)
2Ã·2t
:






































































































































































































































































Assuming symmetry, setting equal to zero, and solving for (p;y) gives,
p =
·










Proof of Proposition 8. We need to compute the equilibrium strategies
for the commercial outlets. Recall, for i = 1;:::;n,
si =







(ui ¡ uj) +






n(ui ¡ ¹ uC)
N(N ¡ 1)t
+
m(ui ¡ ¹ uNC)
N(N ¡ 1)t
:






















































































2N ¡ n ¡ m ¡ 1
N(N ¡ 1)
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Notice that, if x = 1, then @C
@yi = @C
@pi = 0, otherwise, @C
@yi > 0, @C
@pi < 0.


























































































n + m ¡ 1
N(N ¡ 1)t
pC
Solving for xC yields
xC = 1 +





































































N · ¾ · 2n
N . This means that Eq. (8) gives the unconstrained pro¯t-









@® ¸ 0 while
@xC


























where it can be checked that again both SOC's are satis¯ed. Solving Eq. (8)





n2(n+m¡1) , so that, assuming the bounds n
N · ¾ · 2n
N , we can de¯ne,
¤0(Ã;t;m;n;N) =
Ãt(N ¡ 1)













n2(n + m ¡ 1)
¶
as upper and lower bounds for ®. (Since ¾ is not (yet) determined and
depends in an important way on n, we do not yet solve for n, but rather for
® which we bound by the functions ¤0 and ¤1). We distinguish the following
three cases,
CASE 1: x = 0 occurring when ® · ¤0(Ã;t;m;n;N);
CASE 2: x 2 [0;1] occurring when ¤0(Ã;t;m;n;N) < ® < ¤1(Ã;t;m;n;N);
CASE 3: x = 1 occurring when ® ¸ ¤1(Ã;t;m;n;N).
Depending on the values of the parameters, any of the three cases can occur.
It is clear, already from Eq. (8), that larger values of n;m tend to increase x.
33Also, given ® and the other parameters, larger values of n;m tend to make
the conditions for CASE 3 (where x = 1) more likely to be satis¯ed. Hence,
more commercial and non-commercial outlets in the market tend to increase
the level of accuracy.
We next consider CASES 1 and 3. We omit CASE 2 as it is tedious to
analyze and is anyways intermediate between the other two.
CASE 1: x = 0. Here we have
















uC = ¯yC and uNC = ® + ¯yNC









2N ¡ n ¡ m ¡ 1
N(N ¡ 1)
+
¯m(yC ¡ yNC) ¡ ®m
N(N ¡ 1)t
: (10)
CASE 3: x = 1. Here we have
xC = 1;yC =










uC = ® + ¯yC and uNC = ® + ¯yNC















Finally, substituting the expression for ¾ into Eq. (8) above and solving
for n gives a new expression for ¹ nm, the number of (separately owned) com-
mercial media outlets that guarantee that there will be no censorship given
34that there are m non-commercial media outlets in the market. The e®ect of
changing B and C0 on ¾ follow directly from Eqs. (10), (11); the e®ect of ®,
m, n, Ã, N, t on ¹ nm follows from the derived ¹ nm or from Eqs. (10), (11).
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